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REVISED RULE 23: AGGREGATION OF
CLAIMS FOR ACHIEVEMENT OF
JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT
GEORGE A. BANGS*
Historically, class actions were divided into three categories.
In only one of these categories did the courts permit the
claims of all the class members to be aggregated for satisfac-
tion of the minimum jurisdictional dollar amount. The cat-
egories themselves proved to be unrealistic and productive of
considerable confusion. Revised Rule 23 is intended to dis-
place these obsolete classifications and to achieve a more prac-
ticable implementation of the class action concept. The author
argues that aggregation is a logical concomitant of the in-
tended operation of the revised Rule. Since the class action
should now enable adjudication of the totality of the rights of
all class members and since the totality of rights necessarily
includes the totality of the claims, the aggregate of the total
claim does lie in controversy within the meaning of the
jurisdictional statutes.
I. BACKGROUND: AGGREGATION AND JURISDICTION
Congress has conferred original jurisdiction upon the United States
District Courts of all civil actions where the matter in controversy ex-
ceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs,
where the action arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.' Similarly, Congress has granted such jurisdiction in civil
actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and diversity of citizenship
exists? The jurisdictional amount was originally established in 1789
at $500; it was increased in 1887 to $2,000, in 1911 to $3,000, and in
1958 to the present level of $10,000. 3 Obviously, the minimum juris-
dictional amount was established to avoid congestion of the federal
dockets by comparatively trivial controversies. This limitation and its
relationship to and ramifications for the would-be class action suit are
of the greatest importance to the potential reach of revised Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The class action was an invention of English equity jurisprudence
designed to provide adjudication in cases where the interested parties
* Member, American Bar Association, South Dakota Bar Association, Federal Bar
Association; Partner, Bangs, McCullen, Butler, & Foye, Rapid City, South Dakota.
1 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964).
3 See Alvarez v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 992, 995 (5th Cir. 1967).
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were so numerous as to make their individual joinder impracticable'
Having been transplanted to and adopted in this country, the class
action inevitably gave rise to the question of whether the "amount in
controversy" for jurisdictional purposes should be measured by the
claim of the representative plaintiff or plaintiffs, or whether it should
be measured by the aggregate claims of all members of the class.
Original Rule 23 divided class actions into three separate cate-
gories which came to be known popularly as "true," "hybrid" and
"spurious," respectively.' Aggregation was permitted in true class
actions but was not permitted in hybrid or spurious class actitins.° This
effort to categorize class actions according to the nature of the right
involved led to considerable confusion. In Russell v. Stansell, 7 three
taxpayers of an assessment district, for themselves and all others
similarly situated, sought injunction against collection of an assess-
ment on all of the members of the district. The aggregate amount in-
volved exceeded $70,000, but the amounts for which each individual
plaintiff was liable was considerably less than the jurisdictional limit.
The Supreme Court held that the interests of the plaintiffs were distinct
and separate and could not be united for the purpose of making up the
jurisdictional amount. Nine years later, in Brown v. Trousdale,8 several
hundred taxpayers of a Kentucky county, for themselves and all other
taxpayers, alleged the invalidity of a bond issue and sought an injunction
to restrain its collection. The Court, through Chief Justice Fuller, held
that the relief sought could not cause injury to any of the taxpayers
of the county and that the interests of those who did not join in or
authorize the suit were identical with the interests of the plaintiffs. Ac-
cordingly, the rule applied in Russell, where the plaintiffs were each
claiming under a separate and distinct right in respect to a separate
and distinct liability, was held to be inapposite. The opinion goes on
to state: "The amount in dispute, in view of the main controversy, far
exceeded the limit upon our jurisdiction, and disposes of the objection
of appellees in that regard."' Nowhere in the opinion is the Russell
case even mentioned. Moreover, the quoted language of Mr. Chief
Justice Fuller sets forth the wiser rule; and it will subsequently be
argued that this view merits full adoption and compliance.
To set forth and analyze the many cases illustrating the hazards
4 See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940).
6 "[T]he so-called 'true' category was defined as involving 'joint, common, or
secondary rights'; the 'hybrid' category, as involving .`several' rights related to 'specific
property' ; the 'spurious' category, as involving 'several' rights affected by a common
question and related to common relief." Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D.
98 (1966) ' [hereinafter cited as Advisory Note].
6 3A J. Moore, Federal Practice IT 23.13, at 3478 (1968).
7. 105 U.S. 303 (1881).
8 138 U.S. 389 (1891).
9 Id. at 394.
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and difficulties of the effort to "pigeonhole" class actions into the three
historical categories would extend this article beyond reasonable length
and would serve little useful purpose. Suffice it to say, in the words of
the Advisory Committee, that " [iin practice, the terms `joint,"corn-
mon,' etc., which were used as the basis of the Rule 23 classification
proved obscure and uncertain."'
In Alvarez v. Pan American Life Ins. Co.,' the first aggregation
case to reach a court of appeals under revised Rule 23, the Fifth Circuit
denied aggregation. In this case, the plaintiff, a Cuban national, held a
life insurance contract with the defendant. The Castro government ex-
propriated certain assets of the defendant in Cuba and, for this reason,
defendant repudiated its contract obligations with respect to Alvarez
and all other Cuban nationals. Plaintiff apparently sought a declar-
atory reinstatement of such contract rights on behalf of himself and
all others similarly situated. His particular stake in the litigation did
not amount to the jurisdictional minimum but the aggregate claims of
all similarly situated would have met this dollar requirement. The
court adhered to the historical rule that separate and distinct demands
of two or more plaintiffs cannot be aggregated to make up the juris-
dictional amount. Otherwise, reasoned the court, there would be an
infraction of the limitation expressed in Rule 82 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, which provides in part: "These rules shall not be
construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district
courts.... >712
The next case to reach the appellate level on this question found
the Tenth Circuit in disagreement with the Alvarez decision. In Gas
Serv. Co. v. Coburn," a class action was brought by a single customer
of the gas company, having a claim of $7.81, for himself and 18,000
other customers similarly situated whose claims, of course, aggregated to
more than $10,000. The court recognized that the claims were not
joint or common but were several in nature and that aggregation would
not have been permitted prior to the revision of Rule 23. Nevertheless,
aggregation was permitted. The opinion lays great emphasis upon the
view that the amended Rule is intended to eradicate the historical classi-
fication of class actions, and to approach the entire class action concept
on a pragmatic and realistic basis. By this reasoning, the court reaches
the conclusion that the amount in controversy is to be measured by the
aggregate of all claims which are to be considered and adjudicated in the
litigation.
10 Advisory Note, 39 F.R.D. at 98.
11 375 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1967).
12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 82.
la 389 F.2d 831 (10th Cir.), cert. granted, 89 S. Ct. 232 (1968), rev'd, 89 S. Ct. 1053
(1969) (see note 17 infra).
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Almost simultaneously the Eighth Circuit had occasion to pass
upon the question in Snyder v. Harris.' 4
 In a brief per curiam opinion, 16
the court followed the Alvarez case and denied aggregation. Plaintiff
in the Snyder case was the owner of 2,000 shares of stock in a small
life insurance company having a market price of $2.63 per share. Cer-
tain major, but not majority, shareholders who controlled the board of
directors sold their stock to another life insurance company at $7.00
per share and arranged, through serial resignations, that the nominees
of the purchaser obtain immediate control of the board of directors and
its vital committees. Plaintiff sought an accounting of the premium
realized by such selling shareholders. The trial court viewed the claims
of the non-selling shareholders as "separate and distinct demands" and
denied aggregation for jurisdictional purposes upon the principal au-
thority of Pinel v. Pinel." This was a joinder action in which the court
enunciated the doctrine that multiple parties could not aggregate their
claims to satisfy the jurisdictional amount if their interests, however
similar in fact, were in legal theory "several." As stated, the trial court's
ruling in Snyder was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit on the basis of the
Alvarez decision. Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court in
October, 1968, and oral argument scheduled for January, 1969. 17
14 390 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1968).
15 The court stated that the appellant offered little supporting authority aside from
the suggestion of Professor Wright that aggregation should be permitted in all cases on
the ground that the judgment under the new Rule will be binding on all class members
and therefore that the claims for or against the entire class are in controversy within the
meaning of the jurisdictional statute. 2 W. Baron & A. Holtzoff, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 569, at 115 (Wright Supp. 1968).
16
 240 U.S. 594 (1915).
17
 Snyder v. Harris, 390 F.2d 205 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 89 S. Ct. 232 (1968).
This case was consolidated with Gas Serv. Co. v. Coburn, and oral argument was heard
on January 22, 1969. The United States Supreme Court handed down its decision on
March 25, 1969. 89 S. Ct, 1053. HELD: Separate and distinct claims presented by and for
various claimants in a class action pursuant to amended Rule 23 may not be aggregated
to satisfy the requirement of $10,000 jurisdictional amount in controversy in diversity suits.
The opinion of the Court, delivered by Mr. Justice Black, gives unyielding emphasis
to "traditional judicial interpretation," congressional silence and legislative purpose. The
traditional judicial interpretation of "amount in controversy" declares that separate and
distinct claims may not, under any circumstances, be aggregated to satisfy the jurisdic-
tional amount requirement. This judge-made doctrine is perpetuated by the Snyder Court
on the ground that Congress by reenactment and attendant silence has frozen the judicial
interpretation of this statutory language. The majority cites the legislative purpose of
restricting the jurisdiction of the federal courts in diversity matters in support of this
rationale of congressional adoption by congressional silence.
The Court adheres to the "consistent judicial interpretation" of the statutory phrase,
"matter in controversy," and fits it inflexibly upon new Rule 23 procedure. The judicially
developed notion of "matter in controversy" arose and matured in the context of the
three-category view of class actions. Indeed, the majority concedes that "[tjhe 1966
amendment to Rule 23 replaced the old categories with a functional approach to class
actions." 89 S. Ct. at 1056 (emphasis added). Consequently, the Court's resuscitation of the
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As against the thesis of the Alvarez decision, however, it should
be observed that an extension of federal jurisdiction more far reaching
traditional interpretation of the phrase, "matter in controversy," undermines the purpose of
amended Rule 23.
Two considerations in particular militate against the Snyder rationale. First, the
decision equates "class actions formerly classified as spurious" with permissive joinder
under Rule 20. In the latter type of action the claims of plaintiffs cannot be aggregated
even though they too will be bound by the final judgment. This easy analogy overlooks
the significant operative differences between the two Rules. Rule 20 is permissive; it allows
parties to join on a voluntary basis. The claims are combined pursuant to the desire and
initiation of the individuals. Thus, parties would frustrate the purpose of the jurisdictional
amount by expedient consolidation of individual claims to gain access to the federal
forum.
This is not the case under new Rule 23. As the dissent by Mr. Justice Fortas points
out, the amended Rule 23 has, within its sphere of operation, the force of a statute. 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (1964). Thus, by operation of law, the interests of class members are,
from the very outset, viewed as a single entity from which interests may be subtracted at a
later time and not as separate items which may be united at a later time if the parties are
so inclined. The stated effect of judgments in class actions evidences this unity by binding
all the members of the class—even the absent ones (by far, the majority of the class mem-
bers in most cases). The class members are treated as a unit and fragmentation occurs only
on the motion of the members. This arrangement is very different from that under Rule 20,
where the bound parties have voluntarily intervened and actively participate in the action.
Second, tenacious adherence to the traditional judicial interpretation of "matter in
controversy" forecloses the necessary, ongoing evaluation of the jurisdictional statute and
the Rule. The dissent by Mr. Justice Fortas recognizes the groundlessness of this position.
"L'Ilhere is certainly no reason the specific application of this body of federal decisional
law to class actions should be immune from re-evaluation after a fundamental change in
the structure of federal class actions has made its continuing application wholly anoma-
lous." 89 S. Ct. at 1063.
The Court, then, lets pass the opportunity for re-examination of the prior judicial
aggregation doctrines applied originally in the context of a classification of interests as
"joint" or "several," on the ground that Congress has consistently re-enacted the juris-
dictional amount statutes without comment on the traditional judicial interpretation. The
Snyder majority suggests that the upshot is congressional adoption by way of congres-
sional silence—that by its muteness Congress has glaciated the judicial exposition of the
statute. However, the decision itself acknowledges the "hazards and pitfalls" of an un-
bending application of such a yardstick as simultaneous congressional silence and re-enact-
ment. Mr. Justice Fortas warns against the deceptive ease of this technique of statutory
construction:
"It would require very persuasive circumstances enveloping Congressional silence
to debar this Court from reexamining its own doctrines. It is at best treacherous
to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law."
[Quoting from Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1946).1
89 S. Ct. at 1063 (emphasis added).
Congress has simply re-enacted a general statute, and it is mere speculation to assert
that Congress thereby manifested an intent to adopt and perpetuate an existing technical
judicial doctrine. As predicated by the dissent, it is "far more reasonable to assume that
Congress was aware that the courts had been developing the interpretation of the juris-
dictional amount requirement in class actions and would continue to do so after the .. .
amendments." Id. at 1064.
Finally, the majority seizes upon the provisions of Rule 82 prohibiting the courts
from expanding by rule their own jurisdiction. The Court posits that "[airy) , change in
the Rules that did purport to effect a change in the definition of 'matter in controversy'
would clearly conflict with the command of Rule 82 . . . ." Id. at 1057. This
reasoning should be suspect. The gravamen of a violation of Rule 82 is the expansion of
jurisdiction beyond limits set by statute. Rule 82 does not preclude judicial reshaping of
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than the one here advocated was countenanced by the unanimous opin-
ion of the Supreme Court in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs. 18
In the Gibbs case, the plaintiff asserted a claim under the Labor-
Management Relations Act and an additional claim arising from the
same basic facts under state law. Through Mr. Justice Brennan, the
High Court determined that, having assumed jurisdiction under a
federal claim, the trial court had power to adjudicate the related state
claim under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction and could retain that
power to adjudicate the state claim even though the federal claim
might fail upon trial. The opinion states:
This limited approach is unnecessarily grudging. Pendent
jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever
there is a claim "arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority * * *," U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2,
and the relationship between that claim and the state claim
permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court
comprises but one constitutional "case." The federal claim
must have substance sufficient to confer subject matter juris-
diction on the court. Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrie, 289
U.S. 103. The state and federal claims must derive from a
common nucleus of operative fact. But if, considered without
regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims
are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all
in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of
a judicially developed rule (here the boundaries of "matter in controversy") in comport-
ment with evolving needs. Pursuant to statutory authorization, Rule 23 was amended, and
as amended has the effect of statute. The law has created a new type of class action and
thereby altered the procedural context in which subject matter jurisdiction statutes are
to be applied. Mr. Justice Fortas observes,
Imlaking judicial rules for calculating jurisdictional amount responsive to the
new structure of class actions is not an extension of the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts, but a recognition that the procedural framework in which the courts
operate has been changed by a provision having the effect of law.
Id. at 1067.
In fact, the tack taken by the Court is ironical insofar as it purports to follow con-
gressional command but actually tampers with legislative mandate. Rule 23, by operation
of law, authorizes a single suit in the federal courts. In theory and in practice, the "matter
in controversy" is the total claim of the whole class. Therefore, courts may be contra-
vening the jurisdictional statutes by imposition of anachronistic judicial doctrines frag-
menting properly integral claims.
Revised Rule 23 provides a new procedure for the assertion and resolution of multiple
interests in a single action. The Snyder Court itself concedes the "functional" purpose
behind the Rule. Practicability was to receive emphasis, and the uncertainty generated by
the tenuous distinctions among "joint," "common" and "several" claims, and among
"true," "hybrid" and "spurious" class actions was to be removed. In Snyder the Court
reaches a most unfortunate result, unraveling the threads of the new Rule and returning
it to thelnipeless entanglement of the old.
18 383 . U.S. 715 (1966).
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the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to bear the
whole."
This extension of federal jurisdiction is more far reaching than that
effected by aggregation because it involves questions of constitutional
rather than statutory limitations. The Constitution defines the judicial
power as extending to all cases arising under the Constitution, the laws
and treaties of the United States.' The Court has thus determined that
a constitutional "case" can by judicial interpretation be construed to
embrace a non-federal cause of action which arises out of the same
nucleus of operative fact as does a federal cause of action. It should
impose, therefore, no greater strain upon constitutional limitations to
determine that the amount in controversy in a class action embraces all
claims which are to be judicially determined in the case.
One of the leading cases on the subject of federal jurisdiction over
class actions appears to be Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hair v. Cauble. 21
Certain non-resident members of a fraternal benefit association domi-
ciled in Indiana brought a class action against the society in which the
latter prevailed. Thereafter, citizens of Indiana sued the same society
in the state courts seeking to litigate the same issues; the prior federal
judgment was pleaded in bar of the action. The Supreme Court held
that the class action in the federal court was binding and conclusive
upon all members of the class including the Indiana residents. Equity
Rule 38 was then in force: "When the question is one of common or
general interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to
make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more
may sue or defend for the whole." 22 The rule had formerly contained
the following concluding sentence: "But in such cases the decree shall
be without prejudice to the rights and claims of the absent parties.""
The contention was there raised that the change in Rule 38 could
not properly affect the jurisdictional authority of the court, but the
Supreme Court overruled that contention:
The change in Rule 38 by the omission of the qualifying
clause is significant. It is true that jurisdiction, not war-
ranted by the Constitution and laws of the United States, can-
not be conferred by a rule of court, but class suits were known
19 Id. at 725 (footnotes omitted).
20 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
21 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
22 The Federal Equity Rules were the prototypes of the present Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Equity Rule 38 was promulgated by the Supreme Court in 1912. it
read: "When the question is one of common or general interest to many persons constitut-
ing a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court,
one or more may sue or defend for the whole." Equity R. 38, 226 U.S. 659 (1912).
29 255 U.S. at 364.
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before the adoption of our judicial system, and were in use in
English chancery.
The District Courts of the United States are courts of
equity jurisdiction, with equity powers as broad as those of
state courts. 24
Thus the Court seems committed to the proposition that rules of court
may properly have an effect upon the jurisdiction of the federal trial
courts without infringing upon the congressional prerogative of pre-
scribing such jurisdiction.
In the light of this reasoning, it becomes apparent that the re-
vision of Rule 23 has made a significant change in the scope of the
class action by making its outcome binding upon all members of the
class who have not by affirmative act excluded themselves from the
class. The constitutional due process hazards pointed out in Hansberry
v. Lee25 have been avoided by provision for notice under court super-
vision to all members of the class and by imposition upon the trial
judge of the obligation of determining that the named parties afford
adequate representation to the absentees. Since the judgment in the
class action will bind all members and since due process requirements
will be respected, the "amount in controversy" in any class action
brought under revised Rule 23 should be measured by the size of the
judgment which the court could enter upon finding the factual issues in
favor of the plaintiff.
II. THE ARGUMENT FOR AGGREGATION
The entire argument against aggregation is that, historically,
rights of a several rather than a common nature upon which separate
suits might have been brought cannot be joined together for the pur-
pose of fulfilling the jurisdictional dollar minimum." This conclusion
seems unsupported by either logic or policy in the light of the changes
sought to be achieved by the revision of Rule 23. In the words of the
Advisory Committee,
The amended rule describes in more practical terms the occa-
sions for maintaining class actions; provides that all class
actions maintained to the end as such will result in judgments
including those whom the court finds to be members of the
class, whether or not the judgment is favorable to the class;
and refers to the measures which can be taken to assure the
fair conduct of these actions.'
24 Id. at 366 (citations omitted).
25 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
26 See Alvarez v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 992, 994 (5th Cir. 1967)
27 Advisory Note, 39 F.R.D. at 99.
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The obvious purpose of the Rule as amended is to eradicate the tra-
ditional and unsatisfactory categories of "true," "hybrid" and "spu-
rious" actions and to make the class action binding upon all members
of the class. If this purpose of the Rule is to be achieved, it must neces-
sarily follow that the amount in controversy in a class action be mea-
sured by the totality of the claims involved.
The celebrated case of Perlman v. Feldmann" serves as a useful
vehicle to illustrate the practicality and logic of this approach. New-
port Steel Corporation was a comparatively small concern engaged in
the manufacture of steel which was sold to the manufacturers of fin-
ished steel products. During the Korean crisis, such steel was in ex-
ceedingly short supply and the price was regulated, not by governmental
edict but by an understanding among the producers who agreed, for
patriotic reasons, not to increase the price. This situation made New-
port very attractive to users of its products. As a consequence, Mr.
Feldmann, the controlling stockholder, was able to sell his stock to a
syndicate formed by ten customers of the corporation at a price of
$20.00 per share—double the current market value of the stock. Perl-
man, a minority shareholder, brought a class action, denominated a
derivative action, claiming that Feldmann had thereby sold a corporate
asset: the right to control the sale of the corporate product. The trial
court found no cause of action and dismissed the complaint." The Sec-
ond Circuit reversed and apparently transformed the derivative suit
into a non-derivative class action in the following terms:
Hence to the extent that the price received by Feldmann
and his codefendants included such a bonus, he is accountable
to the minority stockholders who sue here. Restatement, Res-
titution §§ 190, 197 (1937) ; Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, supra,
6 Cir., 212 F.2d 389. And plaintiffs, as they contend, are en-
titled to a recovery in their own right, instead of in right of
the corporation (as in the usual derivative actions), since
neither Wilport nor their successors in interest should share
in any judgment which may be rendered. See Southern Pacific
Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 39 S. Ct. 533, 63 L. Ed. 1099.
Defendants cannot well object to this form of recovery, since
the only alternative, recovery for the corporation as a whole,
would subject them to a greater total liability."
Pursuant to remand, the trial court entered a single judgment for a
lump sum, allowed counsel fees and expenses, and directed distribution
of the balance to the nonparticipating shareholders in accordance with
28 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
29 Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162 (D. Conn. 1952).
39 219 F.2d at 178.
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their respective stockholdings.n This judgment can hardly be deemed
typical of a derivative suit since the recovery was awarded, not to
the corporation, but to the individual stockholders who did not par-
ticipate in the wrongdoing. Under the old three-category system, this
would presumably be denoted a spurious class action. Thus, it seems
fair to argue that the Second Circuit anticipated the realism and spirit
of revised Rule 23 and disregarded the supposedly well established
principle that each plaintiff in a spurious class action must have at
stake the minimum jurisdictional amount. Although the exact facts
and figures are not available, it is inconceivable that every minority
stockholder in the corporation had sufficient stock to entitle him to a
recovery equivalent to the jurisdictional amount.
Even if the result be justified on the ground that it was a hybrid
class action in that the action was aimed at a specific fund consisting
of the premium for control-of-product sales received by the selling
shareholder Feldmann, then the ambit of hybrid class actions is con-
siderably broader than either the courts or the commentators have
conceived it to be.
Rather, Perlman v. Feldmann appears to be a classic example of
the impracticability and the inequity of the attempt to divide class
actions into the three historical categories. So viewed, that decision
supports the disposal of the old classifications and vindicates the rea-
soning for the Advisory Committee's revision of Rule 23 on the ground
that the historical categories were confusing, inaccurate and tin-
realistic.
In fact, reality is the lodestar even when the aggregation principle
is examined within the technical confines of the statute. Section 1332
commands that the amount in controversy shall not be less than
$10,000, excluding interest and costs. As noted previously, the original
purpose of a jurisdictional amount was to avoid clogging of the federal
courts with minor litigation. If a court, as in Feldmann, is empowered
in a given case to enter a judgment in one single lump sum in excess of
$10,000, allow payment of litigation costs and attorney fees from
the unit recovery, and direct the distribution of the remainder to a
specified class of persons in a determinable ratio, then the case does
involve more than the jurisdictional amount and the federal court
should have jurisdiction if the representative plaintiff's citizenship is
diverse from that of all the defendants.
Further proof of the unreality of the non-aggregation doctrine is
available from the current controversy involving the well known Play-
boy Clubs. After selling lifetime memberships at a specified fee,
Playboy Clubs imposed a five dollar annual maintenance charge as a
condition to credit privileges. A class action in a United States district
31 Perlman v. Feldmann, 154 F. Supp. 436 (D. Conn. 1957).
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court based on diversity jurisdiction was dismissed for lack of juris-
dictional amount in denial of the aggregation principle. 32
 The state
class action is being settled under court supervision by use of the
mechanics required under revised Rule 23, although counsel for plain-
tiff advises that such procedure, involving mailing of detailed notices of
proposed settlement to all class members, is not prescribed by Califor-
nia rule or statute. The settlement involves distribution of scrip re-
deemable in highly liquid assets at any Playboy Club, to the amount of
$3,700,000. This was a case which a federal court dismissed because
"the matter in controversy" did not exceed $10,000.
The Second Circuit has emphatically proclaimed that one of the
primary functions of the class suit is to provide a device for vindicating
claims which, taken individually, are too small to justify legal action
but which are of significant size if taken as a group." Therefore, under
revised Rule 23, which has overcome the constitutional obstacles men-
tioned in Hansberry v. Lee," the doors of the federal courts should not
be closed against cases which involve very substantial amounts of
money simply because the individual claimants may have less than the
jurisdictional amount at stake. Such a holding would do no violence
whatsoever to the anti-congestion purpose of the jurisdictional amount.
It should also be borne in mind that many of the states do not have the
counterpart of revised Rule 23. Consequently, a denial of federal di-
versity jurisdiction might well mean that a gross wrong involving
many thousands of dollars would go unredressed because no individual
plaintiff would have a sufficient financial stake to justify the payment
of a filing fee, let alone the employment of counsel. In Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin,35 the Second Circuit states with reference to the new
Rule :
Class actions serve an important function in our judicial
system. By establishing a technique whereby the claims of
many individuals can be resolved at the same time, the class
suit both eliminates the possibility of repetitious litigation and
provides small claimants with a method of obtaining redress
for claims which would otherwise be too small to warrant
individual litigation. Nevertheless, Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, as it was originally enacted, did not
effectively achieve either of the above two objectives.
•	 •	 •
We are not persuaded that it is essential that any other
members of the class seek to intervene. Absent class members
32 McCann v. Playboy Clubs Int'I, Civil No. 46250 (ND. Cal., filed Dec. 30, 1966).
33 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 1968).
34 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
35 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
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will be able to share in the recovery resulting in the event of a
favorable judgment, and, if they wish to avoid the binding
effect of an adverse judgment they may in various ways and
at various times that we need not now attempt to partic-
ularize, attack the adequacy of representation in the initial
action or disassociate themselves from the case. Hansberry v.
Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 61 S. Ct. 115, 85 L. Ed. 22 (1940); see
Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class
Actions, 9 Buffalo L. Rev. 433, 436 (1960). If we have to rely
on one litigant to assert the rights of a large class then rely we
must. The dismissal of the suit out of hand for lack of proper
representation in a case such as this is too summary a pro-
cedure and cannot be reconciled with the letter and spirit of
the new ruIe. 30
This same concern for the vindication of the rights of persons whose
damages are small individually but large in the aggregate has led
Professor Loss to observe: "The ultimate effectiveness of the federal
remedies, when the defendants are not prone to settle, may depend in
large measure on the applicability of the class action device.""
III. CONCLUSION
It would be inappropriate to conclude any discussion of the far
reaching effects of revised Rule 23 without reference to the well con-
sidered observations of Judge Frankel of the Southern District of New
York.38 Judge Frankel suggests that a class suit by a single stockholder
to compel payment of a dividend affects the whole class of stockholders
and that, therefore, the amount in controversy is to be judged by the
total sum due to all members of the class." However, he continues in
the next breath to endorse the decision of the Fifth Circuit in the
Alvarez case° where that court respected the historical rule that sep-
arate and distinct claims (the former "spurious" category) of two or
more plaintiffs cannot be aggregated to satisfy the jurisdictional
amount.
If Alvarez is assumed to be legally entitled to a reinstatement of
his policy, which was repudiated by the defendant, along with the
policy obligations of all other Cuban nationals, then in a class ac-
tion under the revised Rule, the total amount in controversy should
be measured by the claims of all policyholders similarly situated. Judge
36 Id. at 560, 563.
37 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1819 (2d ed. 1961).
38 Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39
(1968).
39 Id. at 49.
4°Id. at 50.
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Frankel himself recognizes the force of this argument.' His suggestion
that cases cognizable under subdivisions (b) (1) and (b) (2) of the re-
vised Rule should be eligible for aggregation, but that cases cognizable
under subdivision (b) (3) should be denied aggregation, has the ap-
peal of permitting a "pigeonhole" treatment similar to the historical
treatment of class actions under the three-category system. As argued
above, such treatment is antithetical to the purpose and thrust of the
revised Rule.
A reading of the revised Rule in its entirety, in the context of the
notes of the Advisory Committee, compels the conclusion that the
ultimate purpose is to make the judgment in any class action binding
upon all members of the class. The spurious class action, which was
merely a device for voluntary intervention, is extinct. Members of a
purported class may exempt themselves from the binding effect of the
judgment by "opting out" pursuant to notice under subdivision (b)(3)
and thereby protect their right to prosecute their individual remedies
as they may see fit. There is to be no concern whether the right as-
serted on behalf of the class is a right which is held jointly, severally
or in common. To those who protest that this is judicial invention in-
dependent of legislative enactment, it can only be replied that the class
action itself was, in its origin, a judicial invention elicited by necessity.
To produce a broader, more comprehensive and more binding form of
class action does not require legislative initiative but merely a longer
period of judicial gestation.
The judiciary invented the class action device in order to deal with
controversies in which the number of parties involved was so great as
to render it impractical to bring them all before the court. Traditionally
the judgment in such a class action has been deemed to be binding upon
all members of the class only in those cases where the right sought to
be vindicated or enforced was a right held in common, rather than
severally. It is now recognized by the framers of revised Rule 23 that
the complexity of contemporary legal relationships requires that the
judgment in a class action be binding upon all members of the class
even though their rights be held severally rather than in common. Ap-
propriate means have been devised to inform the members of the class
of the pendency of the action and of their right to adequate representa-
tion. Means have been devised also to enable the owner of a clearly
separate and severable right to withdraw from the class action and
proceed in accordance with his own desires and with his own counsel.
Viewed in this light, each action is designed to adjudicate the
totality of the rights of the members of the class. Consequently, the
41 Id. at 51-52.
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amount in controversy should and must be determined by the totality
of the claims to be adjudicated. The word "aggregation" is thus prob-
ably a misnomer. The "amount in controversy" in any action sought to
be introduced in the federal court system should be determined in a
manner that defers to reality—by the total amount of the rights which
will be adjudicated in the case.
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